Running post-war Iraq

Running post-war Iraq: Questioning a precedent from the Afghan war
Posted on Monday, April 07 @ 10:02:30 EDT
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By Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, Boston Globe

KABUL, Afghanistan -- The swift US-led victory in ousting a tyrannical regime in Afghanistan was viewed by many in the Bush administration as an omen, if not a blueprint, for success in Iraq.

But many Afghan and Western officials who presided over the defeat of the Taliban regime are questioning whether Washington drew the right lessons from its victory here or whether it risks following a very different Afghan model for Iraq: that of the Soviet occupation.

Among their concerns: Iraq's future government should be formed by Iraqis, not Americans, and a broad international alliance should guide a postwar transition to avoid the perception that Washington is colonizing a proud nation and a cradle of Arab civilization.



"You have to prove this war was not just for oil or a geopolitical strategic goal, that it was not aimed at a religion or people," said Omar Samad, a spokesman for the Afghan Foreign Ministry. "Iraqis, like Afghans, have to feel that they are regaining ownership of their country and their lives."

Afghans have watched the military campaign in Iraq with anxiety through the lens of the recent war in their own country.

The two theaters are quite different. The strength and resources of Iraq's professional army far surpass those of the Taliban. And the lack of armed Iraqi resistance has made it impossible for the United States to depend almost exclusively on local allies in the ground war, as it did in Afghanistan.

Similarly, the existence of an Afghan opposition united -- unlike in Iraq -- meant that the composition of a new administration was partially hashed out before the war. The idea of an interim US de-facto governor -- a controversial but likely scenario for Iraq -- never arose in Afghanistan.

Another difference is that the United Nations and most of the international community, shocked by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, committed fully to both the costly war and the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan.

In contrast, the UN rift, and the anger in Washington about European opposition, have prompted Bush officials to balk at giving the United Nations and Europe a signficant role in postwar Iraq. It's a go-it-alone attitude that many in Kabul see as a perilous mistake.

Afghan and European officials also worry that the longer the war lasts, and the more civilian lives it claims, the greater the risk that the United States will be viewed as invaders, not liberators, no matter how much Iraqis may hate Saddam Hussein.

Colonel Roger King, a spokesman for US-led forces here, suggested that most Afghans accept the continuing presence of 11,500 foreign combat troops (8,500 from the United States) because the coalition "allowed Afghans to regenerate their own government rather than us doing it for them."

Like many former opposition leaders, the foreign minister, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, supports the war against Hussein out of empathy for the Iraqi people, who, he says, have suffered under Hussein as Afghans did under the Taliban.

Abdullah praised the European-led mission in Kabul for "working in a way that is virtually invisible," and the US-led combat troops for "working with local forces and respecting local culture to a large extent."

Their job was made easier, he said, by the presence of an Afghan resistance that waged the ground war, and by a political resistance that had held government posts before the Taliban. Four years before the Taliban was ousted, opposition forces were plotting an alternate leadership in meetings in Europe and Afghanistan.

Hamid Karzai, who became interim leader shortly after the Taliban fell in late 2001, was already being discussed by resistance leaders in the days before the war began, Abdullah said.

Iraqi opposition figures appear not to have coalesced around an acceptable postwar leader. Hussein, meanwhile, has waged a public relations campaign to make himself a victim in the eyes of Iraqis. These factors that could mitigate against a smooth transition to a new Iraqi leadership.

A senior UN official said that the major challenge of forming a postwar government in Baghdad will be this question: "Who is going to be at the table and who is not? How much does the US get to decide who are the good guys and the bad guys?"

With 40 different Iraqi political parties and no unified opposition, forming an interim administration may be harder in Iraq than it was here, said the US ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn. But, he reasoned, after "a strong dictatorship, any American military administration will be better than that.

"There's a window the Americans and coalition will have to make changes, a period during which people will be happy to see them," Finn said. "This is not going to be Japan where you had a military governor for several years. This will . . . put in a structure after the collapse of a regime and make a transition to an elected representative government as soon as possible. America has neither the intent nor the psychology to be a colonial power."

Finn has a point in saying that the United States is not regarded in Afghanistan as an invading army in the Soviet manner. But many here voice concern that the Americans may be viewed as such in Iraq, if a massive US military force stays on the ground even a day too long after ousting Hussein.

"I am 100 percent sure that a foreign government or administration would not have worked here," Abdullah said.

If Iraqis perceive Americans as occupiers, the United States could face a bloody revolt, not only by Iraqis, but also by jihadis from all over the Muslim world, as happened in Kabul.

Samad, an Afghan-American, advised Washington to respect "the right of the people to determine their democratic future, and . . . rebuild what has been damaged, not alone, but with other countries."

France's ambassador to Kabul, Jean-Pierre Guinhut, describes as "faultless" the post-Sept. 11 joint commitment to Afghanistan by the United States, Europe, and Japan.

"The key lesson of Afghanistan is the international community working together," he said. Whatever the differences over the handling of the Iraqi crisis, Guinhut said, "we will, all of us, have to rebuild the destruction in Iraq."

Postwar Afghanistan may offer lessons not only for the United States, but also for those who may soon be living in postwar Iraq.

Barnett Rubin, a scholar on Afghanistan at the Center for International Cooperation at New York University, warns Iraqis that his experience suggests that "Americans are not going to understand local politics very well. They're going to come in with preconceived notions of good guys and bad guys, and they're going to make some big mistakes."

In 18 months in Afghanistan, the United States has learned a lot, Rubin said. But it will take them some time to learn the realities of Iraq.

Repairing war damage may be easier there, since Iraq is a resource-rich country with modern infrastructure and an educated populace. But economic and political reconstruction, not to mention gaining the trust of the people, requires a "long commitment and a lot of money, which we're not spending here," Rubin said, "and a very strong global coalition, which we don't have in Iraq."

© Copyright 2003 Globe Newspaper Company.
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